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ABSTRACT 
 
Over the past five decades, the International Monetary Fund which was set up in 1944 in New 
Hampshire as part of the Bretton Woods institution has become and international lender of last 
resort. This portfolio allows member countries to apply for support in the event of a balance of 
payment deficit. These loans or support programmes come with conditionalities where there is 
enforced discipline in the monetary and fiscal framework of the lendee country. 
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over the past decades have dealt with the IMF over a number of 
programmes from Structural Adjustments to Extended Credit facility programmes. Many have 
questioned the short and long run results of such programmes due to the conditionalities attached. 
This study primarily focused on assessing the impact of IMF bailouts on monetary policy rates, 
foreign direct investment and domestic credit to the private sector. 
The study in using panel data with fixed effects and random effects of African countries from 2004 
to 2018 found out that IMF bailouts had a positive relationship with monetary policy rate and was 
negatively correlated with foreign direct investments and domestic credit to the private sector. The 
recommendations made were that, the independence of the central bank must be maintained such 
that the setting of the monetary policy rate is not influenced by IMF agreements. Again it was 
recommended that governments should set up special institutions that will provide affordable 
credit with easy access to the private sector. This special institution should not be influenced by 
any economic reform or condition that is imposed by the IMF so as to keep a thriving private 
sector.  
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CHAPTER ONE                                                                                                   
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0  Background of the study 
After the second world war, the United States which had assumed the position of a world leader 
sought to bring stability, peace and prosperity into the world economy. To encourage international 
cooperation and hasten the reconstruction of the world, several international organisations were 
set up namely the General Agreement on Tariffs (GATT), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the Bank for Reconstruction and Development now known as the World Bank. At the inception of 
the International Monetary Fund in New Hampshire- Bretton Woods in July 1944, only three 
countries represented Africa (Ethiopia, Union of South Africa and Egypt) as the rest of the 
continent were being governed by the imperialist. This goes to suggest that the IMF has had much 
of its dealings in programmes and policy based lending in post – independence Africa. The primary 
goals of the fund are to enhance cooperation in the international monetary system, bring stability 
into the exchange rate regime, eliminate barriers in capital flow and support the balance of payment 
deficits of members (Weiss, 2014). 
Any member country that experiences economic challenges can apply for financial support from 
the IMF. The IMF provides concessional (no interest) and non-concessional (market interest rate 
applied referred to as the charging rate) credit facilities (Oberdabernig, 2013). The concessional 
loans consist of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF) and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). The non- concessional 
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facilities come with high conditions consisting of Stand by Arrangements (SBA) and the Extended 
Credit Facility. 
Accordingly, the IMF conditionality is the result of a series of negotiations between the IMF and 
countries concerned. This is a string of policy guidelines attached to the facilities to inject fiscal 
and monetary disciplines into the economy of the lendee country (Evrensel, 2002). This is 
primarily to ensure that the programme nations are adhering to the guidelines which is able help 
stabilise their Balance of Payment and fulfill their debt obligation (Bird & Willet, 2004 ). 
Accordingly, when these principles are effectively planned and executed, it leads to an 
enhancement of the macroeconomic indices and currency crises are less probable to occur (Dreher 
& Walter, 2009). The IMF however argues that the underlying principle of these conditionalities 
is to prevent the misuse of the facilities so that the very purpose for which the facility was taken 
could be realised. 
 
1.1  The IMF and Africa 
Most African countries came into contact with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the 
1960’s. Since then, there have been a series of arrangement with IMF from Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAP’s) to Extended Credit Facilities. These arrangements have come to support 
payment deficits and stabilize the macro-economic environment. Indeed, the bailouts from the IMF 
do not come as they are but with a whole lot of conditions. These attached strings to the bailouts 
is said to inject Fiscal discipline into government spending, control public debt and rising inflation. 
Accordingly, the expectation after conditioning on IMF policies is to see inequality decline, 
unemployment reducing and the poverty gap closed, but these over the years have not been the 
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case. The pragmatic policies of the IMF get to be achieved on paper in terms of the macro- 
economic indices but the qualitative aspect of the economy gets worse. Certain aspects of the 
economy thrive well and other sensitive sectors gets to be neglected as a result of these conditions. 
Moreover, the history and governance structure of the IMF have been criticised in their relations 
with the Third World. In African countries, the IMF creates injurious SAP’s and rigid conditions 
and financing of balance of payments (BoP) challenges, debt bail-outs and economic recovery in 
post conflict areas.  
 
1.2 Monetary Policy Rate and Bank Credit   
Monetary policy is a macroeconomic policy tool that is carried out by the central bank to regulate 
money supply and interest rates all in a bid to control inflation and maintain general thrust in the 
economy. It could also enhance the achievement of unemployment, growth and to maintain 
exchange rate stability. Monetary policy enables central banks manage liquidity to create economic 
growth (Kimberly, 2016). Liquidity denotes how much there is in the supply of money. This 
comprises of loanable funds, payment instruments, cash and money market mutual funds. The 
most important of these is credit. That includes loans, bonds and mortgages. 
The central bank has at its disposal several tools to manage the liquidity level in the economy, 
depending on the tools and results achieved, the policy could be contractionary or expansionary. 
Contractionary monetary policy is implemented by the federal bank to fulfill its primary mandate 
of preventing inflation (Amadeo, 2016). In this regard, the central bank tends to increase the 
reserve requirements of the commercial banks, raise interest rates and use open market operations 
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which is the sale of government bonds. This results in the shifting of the aggregate demand curve 
downwards thereby decreasing price. 
In the reverse case of achieving an expansionary monetary policy, the central bank lowers the 
reserve requirement whiles it purchases government bonds and reduces interest rates. According 
to Moffat (2016), an expansionary policy leads to an increase in the price of bonds, reduces demand 
for domestic currency, raises capital investment and inadvertently couples it with a rise in demand 
for foreign currency. 
Accordingly, African countries like Ghana has been adopting the monetary policy tools mentioned 
above for economic stability. Evidently, the central bank of Ghana has an appreciable wider scope 
as two of its prime objectives are to; formulate and implement monetary policy aimed at achieving 
the objects of the bank and to promote by monetary measures the stabilization of the value of the 
currency within and outside Ghana (Bank of Ghana, 2002). Ghana has a history of monetary 
management which could be sectioned into two. The first can be categorized as the period with 
monetary controls and the other where by monetary policy saw development in a liberal economic 
setting. Accordingly, before 1983, the country witnessed a direct controlled system of monetary 
management which was a function of direct intervention instruments (Bank of Ghana, 2015). 
Popular amongst such interventions was the imposition of thresholds (credit control) in 
commercial banks’ lending such that they were in line with the national macroeconomic indices 
of growth, inflation and external balance. This resulted in many sectors of the economy becoming 
ineffective and thereby was dropped by 1983 because the economy became liberalized. 
Consequently, all the tools available to central banks for monetary policy management tend to 
affect the credit availability of the commercial banks. A tight monetary policy will reduce the 
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available credit for banks thereby reducing the supply of loanable funds. If tight monetary policy 
increases banks’ external finance premium, banks may respond by reducing the total amount of 
credit they are willing to supply (Stein, 1998). In addition to, changes in monetary policy affect 
both aggregate bank loan supply and the distribution of bank loan supply.  
1.3  Problem Statement 
The significance and key role of firms (especially private) to the economies of developing 
countries cannot be over looked as Africa pepares itself to drive the industrialisation agenda and 
increase trade. It is important to recognise that the contribution of firms to reducing 
unemployment, raising incomes of households cannot be over emphasized. The government and 
the banks have a role to play if Africa is to harness its potential. 
Notwithstanding, firms access to debt financing has not been addressed as indicated by (Kwaning, 
Nyantakyi, & kyereh, March 2015). In an attempt to address the teething challenges of private 
sector, most countries have set up bodies to specifically cater for the needs of the pivate sector. 
Howeve, as to whether these agencies have delivered above expectations leaves more empirical 
questions than answers.  
Undoubtedly, according to Kwaning et al (2015), in reference to the world bank statistics, 90 per 
cent of small enterprises surveyed indicated access to credit a primary challenge to investment. 
This was due to the fact that financial intistutions perceive SME’s to be of high credit risk. In 
additon to the above stated issues, paramount amongst them is high asymmetry arising  from 
improper  record of accounts which makes financial institutions pressed to assess their viability 
request for credit (Hayford, 2012). 
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Besides, it is no doubt that firms rely heavily on capital injection to remain competive, grow and 
expand to meet the demands of the growing populace. Hence the absence of cheap cost of credit 
goes a long way to pose a chain of challenges to private firm owners.Commercial banks in the last 
few years have started paying attention to  the needs of the private sector with some banks now 
creating special purpose departments to oversee and lend support to the business community.  
The lending rates of banks do not arise in isolation as the macro economic indices are 
interdependent on each other. As indicated earlier, the MPR as determined by the central bank is 
the rate it borrows to the commercial banks. If the IMF in arrangement with government enforces 
conditionalities in the macro environment, it presupposes that the MPR would be affected and 
hence the lending rate of commercial banks. The long run effect is that the pivate sector gets to be 
crippled due to IMF bailouts conditions. 
Africa over the last few decades have considered the private sector as the engine of growth. Over 
the years, govenments have partenered the private sector in many ways to stimulate growth and 
productivity. If the private sector gets to be challenged in the area of credit, then the vision of the 
industrialising Africa risks becoming a reality and goes to buttress the point that the IMF indeed 
by way of their policies do not enable countries to grow and develop. 
With the aforementioned discussed issues, the questions this study seeks to answer are: 
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1.4  Research questions 
1. What is the impact of IMF bailouts on the policy rate? 
2. What is the effect of IMF bailouts on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Domestic 
Credit (DC)?  
1.5  Objectives of the Study 
The objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of IMF bailouts on monetary policy rate. The 
specific objectives are; 
2. To evaluate the impact of IMF bailouts on the policy rate. 
3. To examine the effect of IMF bailouts on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Domestic 
Credit (DC).  
1.6   Justification of the Study 
Most African countries have a developing economy and its capacity to create the conditions for 
private sector growth will contribute immensely to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), reduce 
unemployment, increase production and eventually reduce poverty by increasing household 
income levels. As indicated earlier, private sector’s contribution to GDP is about 90 percent and 
hence its significance is undoubted leading to a study in this area. 
Governments over the years have not succeeded in broadening the tax net. This has become an 
issue of political will as against pragmatic policies targeted at addressing the problem. Budget 
statements over the years have highlighted government’s commitment towards mobilising enough 
revenue to finance the development agenda in most countries. Some strategies and programmes 
are highlighted in these statements but are hardly implemented to achieve the very purpose for 
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which they were constituted. This study brings to light the needed knowledge on being under an 
IMF programme and how it impacts private firm’s ability to meet their tax obligations.  
This paper seekst to expouse on the relationship that being under an IMF bailout progamme has 
on bank credit and consequnetly private firms contribution to GDP . With this understanding, 
government would be guided to formulate polices that would help to make credit available to the 
private sector through prudent management of the policy rate and its direct dealings with the 
commercial banks. Government will be best positioned to look at the gains and losses of signing 
unto an IMF credit facility. Furthermore , as the private sector  is key to development, more 
research in credit dynamics is very much needed to contribute significantly to the wealth of 
knowledge available so that stakeholders are able to keep up with the changing global economic 
frameworks for doing business. Ultimately, it also contributes to existing literature for reference 
and stimulate further research. 
1.7   Scope  and Oganisation of the Study 
The study looks at the influence of  being under an IMF bailout programme has on the policy rate 
by the Central Bank. The study mainly focused on the policy rates, commercial lending rates and 
the year’s African countries have had an IMF arrangement. Other micro and macro economic 
indicators were considered in the analysis. All the parameters were drawn from the national 
aggregate figures. Additionally, policy papers that have been championed by past and present 
governments were entirely reviewed. The indices were drawn from 1980 to 2018. 
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Accordingly, the study consists of five main chapters. The first chapter deals with the background 
information of the study, statement of the problem, research objectives and research questions. 
Chapter two discusses the theoretical perspectives of the study and also review the conceptual 
framework upon which the study is grounded. This is followed by chapter three that discusses the 
methodology used to address the objectives of the study.  Chapter four presents the analysis and 
discussion of results and chapter five gives a conclusion to the discussions with policy 
recommendations.   
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CHAPTER TWO                                                                                                              
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the various literature related to the study. The section is presented in three 
parts. The first part discusses the theoretical perspective of the study and the assumptions 
underlying the theory. The second part espouses on the conceptual frame work of the study and 
how the various parameters are related. Finally, the chapter highlights some empirical studies that 
have been carried out by previous researchers on this topic.  
2.1  Theoretical Framework 
2.1.1 Pecking Order Theory 
The study is gounded in the Pecking Order Theory. This theory was initially coined by Donaldson 
in the year 1961. It was further modified and theorised by Myers & Majluf  (1984). The main 
assumption of the theory is information assymetry which suggests that managers of a firm are fully 
aware of the potential and risks of their firms than external investors. This assymteric information 
enables them to make decisions about internal and extenal financing schemes. Accodingly, the 
theory outlines the capital stucture available to firms in order of peference. Firms will utilise 
internal funds first as a first option and when it is depleted, they will issue debt to finance the firm. 
The last altenative is to issue equity which in most cases result in the decline of share pice.  
As stated earlier, the most pressing needs of private firms is capital injection if they are to remain 
competitive and grow to meet the changing demands of consumers. This empiricaly places the 
availability of internal funds into the realm of uncertainty. The next surity of financing to rely on 
according to the Pecking Order theory is the issuing of debt. Indeed the issuing of debt is preferred 
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to equity , therefore,  knowledge on how government’s engagement witht the IMF affects the 
commecial lending rate is therefore critical to the survival of the private sector. 
2.1.2 Loan Pricing Theory   
This theory stipulates that, the cost of credit could raise information asymmetry challenges in 
relation to moral hazard and loan acceptance dilemma (Stieglitz and Weiss, 1998). High cost of 
credit may warrant adverse selection problems such that those who are not risk averse may 
probably go for loans with a high cost. On the other hand, Clients that are adversely selected are 
more likely to exhibit some form of moral hazard behaviour due to the higher probability of 
misapplication of funds on their part in very volatile ventures which are very far from the purpose 
undersigned in the loan agreement process.     
2.1.3 Loanable funds theory  
This theory argues out that, the market forces pertaining to the demand and supply of credit or 
excess reserves by the bank is the primary predictor of the cost of credit. Accordingly, in the money 
market, when demand exceeds the supply of credit, the cost of credit increases benefitting banks 
in the process and serving as a disincentive to the borrowing public. Again, this theory is grounded 
on the classical assumptions of credit by stipulating that the supply of money significantly has a 
determination in the rate of savings leading to investment thereby placing the market cost of credit 
at the point where demand and supply meet. The perspective shared by the loanable theory is that 
all players in the market should be equally compensated at the market equilibrium.  
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2.2 Conceptual Framework 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Conceptual framework 
Source: Authors Own Construct 
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The central Bank is at the Apex of this structure. The central bank sets the monetary policy rate. 
This is the rate at which the central bank borrows money to the commercial banks. The commercial 
banks are also regulated by the central banks. To declare their viability and solvency to do business, 
they required to meet the reserve requirement ratio. This is set by the central bank such that every 
commercial bank can prove to have enough liquid to be able to accept deposits from the public. 
The commercial banks finance their lending transactions with the public based on the monetary 
policy rate. This implies that if the monetary policy rate is high, the commercial bank lending rate 
would also be high. The commercial banks transact business with both the private sector (firms) 
and households. The trickling down effect is that, the high monetary policy rate tends to be 
transferred to the borrowing public. This leads to crowding out of the private sector. The private 
sector would then remain less competitive and be unable to expand. 
The public also deal with the commercial banks on the basis of deposits where those with deposit 
accounts earn interest income on their deposits. When the lending rate is higher than the deposit 
rate, it creates a negative interest rate spread. There are also smaller financial institutions (Savings 
and Loans & Microfinance) who deal directly with the commercial banks even though they are 
supervised by the central bank. They borrow from the commercial banks and lend to the public. 
Since they also borrow from the commercial banks to support the informal sector, they also carry 
the effect of high monetary policy rates and ultimately their dealings with households and firms. 
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2.3 Empirical Framework 
What constitutes IMF Agreements?   
A strong and robust monetary institution is at the heart of the IMF’s agenda. The documentation 
and empirical strategies to achieving this height leaves the question of how? When any member 
country faces a problem of deficit in its balance of payments, it can rely on the lender of last resort. 
This calls for a period of negotiations and agreements on the modalities of the support. This support 
comes in to inject some form of fiscal and monetary discipline in the economy so that the funds 
used to support the payment deficits can be repaid (Bird, 2001). With the string of disciplines 
enforced, one area that is envisaged to see improvements is the international reserves of the country 
and exchange rate stability. In most situations, economic growth is chalked and retrogressive 
economic management strategies are undone to bring the country back on track to growth and 
prosperity. 
A few studies have been done on IMF agreements with a few focusing on developing economies. 
Although the concept of IMF presenting itself as a lender of last resort, its operations over the last 
three decades have been criticized because IMF agreements have paid insufficient attention to the 
social perspective of development (Heidhues, 2011). Again, questions have been raised as to the 
contribution of these agreements on institutional and market development in the third world. 
Others such as Herbst (1990) have argued on the behalf of the IMF that strings of IMF bailouts in 
the third world in particular sought to prevent the misuse and misapplication of funds by 
politicians. One study which has empirically been cited on the operations of the IMF in the third 
world is that of Dollar and Svenson (2000). Based on their assessments of 200 IMF programmes 
on why some failed and succeeded. The issue of contextual political economy was critical in 
determining the outcome of such Agreements. Again, further arguments suggest that poor resource 
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allocation and lack of better home grown policies contributed to the many IMF bailout support in 
Africa (Geo-Jaja and Mangum, 2001). 
Even though IMF bailouts were intended to address balance of payments deficits by injecting some 
economic reforms in such nations, the reforms have been noted to adversely affect the devaluing 
of currencies. Furthermore, these reforms encouraged trade liberalizing, elimination of 
government subsidies and the privatisation of state owned enterprises which may not auger well 
for the economy (London et al., 2012). Upon studying IMF bailouts in Sub –Saharan Africa in 
depth, Ismi (2004) realised that IMF bailouts led to lower growth, increased inequality, poor HDI 
indices and rising debt.   
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CHAPTER THREE                                                                                           
METHODOLOGY 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the type of research design used for the study. A discussion of the tools 
used to analyze the results is also presented. The approach of the study is presented followed by 
the study area. It goes further to expound on the sources of data. Discussions of the data validation 
process and ethical concerns are also explained. The final section discuss the analysis of data 
retrieved. 
3.1 Research Design 
The study applies a quantitative research approach. This constitutes the application of quantitative 
methods in addressing the objectives of the study. According to Babbie (2011), quantitative 
methods deal with the measurement of statistical data analysis. Quantitative data are retrieved by 
surveys and polls and in some cases by the manipulation of existing data through computational 
tools. It could also constitute the collection of numerical data for generalization purposes amongst 
a particular class of people and to give meaning to a given phenomenon. 
A quantitative approach allows for gathering data with the use of well-structured questionnaires. 
Due to the nature of quantitative study, it enables a study to be repeated depending on its robustness 
and authenticity (Signh, 2007). With this approach, the data is mostly captured in tables, charts 
and figures which aide in predicting future results and helps in examining correlations amongst 
variables (Craig et al, 2011). 
 Notwithstanding, quantitative methods have limitations. Owing to its structured nature in 
collecting data, it becomes challenging to unearth new discoveries in the process to enrich results 
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discussion. Again, results obtained from this method are somehow silent on the behavior, 
motivations and perceptions of respondents. These properties are in most cases hidden in the 
results retrieved. Instances of Structural bias and error in representation can occur due to the 
structured manner of the instrument used (McNabb, 2008). Based on this, results may in most 
cases reflect the opinions of the investigator rather than the study population. 
Stemming from the above, it was important to adapt a quantitative approach for the study. 
According to Madrigal and McClain (2012), quantitative methods most appreciated edge is 
producing data that has a descriptive sense. This method aided the description and analysis of the 
demographic properties of the respondents. This allowed for the making of inferences. In 
answering the first objective, a simple linear regression was adopted. This method helped to 
analyse the causal relationships between the dependent and explanatory variables. Upon the use of 
the use of this method, variables which had significant causal relationships were showcased.  
Specifically, the quantitative method applied was the Panel data model. It is a kind of data also 
referred to as longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data units like households, 
individuals, firms and countries. Again in econometrics, panel data depicts a multi-dimensional 
data that constitutes measurements over a period of time. In addition, panel data captures a 
researcher's observations of several variables that have been collated over a period for a particular 
group of entities. Panel data models allow for a large set of data observations thereby increasing 
the degrees of freedom. This decreases the collinearity that the independent variables have 
amongst themselves and hence reduces the biases in the estimated parameters (Wooldridge, 2002; 
Baltagi, 2005). 
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Moreover, one of the issues that econometric analysis suffers from is the issue of omitted variable 
bias. Panel data helps to control for omitted or unobserved factors in the error term which are time 
invariant. This goes to reduce the effect of unobserved time invariant factors that might be 
correlated with the explanatory variables thereby not biasing the estimates. Since panel data has a 
time dimension and a cross dimension, it also makes the computation and inference of estimates 
easier. However, one of the limitations of panel data models is that, it is not able to control for 
time variant unobserved factors that may be correlated with the explanatory variables. One of the 
ways to deal with such limitations is the Fixed effects or Random effects approach. The study 
made use of both approaches to enhance the results of the estimates. 
3.2 Data sources and Analysis 
The study made use of secondary data of Sub- Saharan African counties. Relevant liteature and 
data sources was  reviewed to acquire the needed data fo the analysis. The Wold Bank Data Portal 
and Publications,International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
Data Portal and publications, Technical Papers and Reports of Central Banks of African countries 
and other relevant sources will reviewed in the data collection pocess. The data was captured in 
Excel and exported to Statistics and Data (STATA) for the analysis. The data was scrutinized to 
determine their suitability, reliability, adequacy and accuracy. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
3.2.1 Model specification 
The primary model for analysing the first objective was a Panel Data with fixed /Random Effects. 
Balanced fixed panel data (Wooldridge, 2002) of Sub-Saharan African countries with IMF 
agreements from 2004 to 2018 expressed as follows:    
𝒀𝒊 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑨 +  𝜸𝑿𝒊 +  𝒛𝒊 +  𝒂𝒊 + 𝝁𝒊 
Where 
𝒀𝒊 - Monetary Policy (Objective one) and 
 𝒀𝒊 - GDP growth / Foreign Direct Investment/ Domestic Credit to Private Sector for (Objective 
two)        
𝑨 - IMF participation 
𝑿𝒊 - Set of controls (Financial Risk, Investment Profile, Risk of Budget Balance, Risk of Inflation, 
Risk of Debt service, Risk of Exchange Rate, Risk of Current Account as percentage of GDP, Risk 
of GDP growth, Economic Risk, Deposit Interest Rate, Interest Rate spread and Broad Money as 
percent of GDP) 
𝒁𝒊 - State fixed effects 
𝒂𝒊 - Year fixed effect
20 
 
Table 3.2.a: Selected explanatory variables for the Panel data regression analysis 
Source: Authors own construct
Variable Definition A-Priori 
Expectation 
Supporting 
Literature 
Data 
Source 
IMF Bailout The event of a country signing on to an IMF progamme Positive (Jeanne et al, 
2001) 
IMF 
Financial Risk 
 
The inability of an entity or firm to meet its financial obligation. Positive (Jena, 2011) ICRG 
Investment Profile  
 
This profile gives a score as to the relative conduciveness in investing 
in an entity.  
Negative (UNCTAD, 
2012) 
ICRG 
Risk of Budget Balance  
 
The probability of a government to running into a deficit where 
expenditure exceed income 
Positive (Datar, 2003) ICRG 
Risk of Inflation  
 
The probability that the cash flows from an investment will not 
have the same value in the future due to the rate of price increase. 
Negative (Halpern, 
1983) 
ICRG 
Risk of Debt service  
 
The probaility of a government not meeting its debt obligation Positive (Cohen, 1990) ICRG 
Risk of Exchange Rate  
 
Events of losses likely to occur in international financial transactions 
due to ones currency fluctuations. 
    Positve (Sohmen, 
1965) 
ICRG 
Risk of Current Account 
as % GDP 
Current accounts are the difference between the value of exports of 
commodities and the value of imports of commodities. Deficits  
are usually controlled by loans or grants. 
Positive (Ghose, 2013) ICRG 
Risk of GDP growth  
 
which measures the growth rate of GDP that should be exceeded in 
all but the worst 5 per cent of expected outcomes (the 5th percentile 
of the year-ahead GDP growth distribution) 
Negative (Kharroubi, 
2007) 
ICRG 
Economic Risk  
 
Is the risk whereby exchange rates, inflation and other economic 
indicators are likely to affect an investment. 
Positive (Shiller, 2003) ICRG 
Deposit Interest Rate 
 
The interest income accruing to deposit accounts holders Positive (Startz, 1983) World 
Bank 
Interest Rate spread  
 
This is defined as the lending interest rate minus the deposit interest 
rate. 
Negative (Mujeri & 
Younus, 2009) 
World 
Bank 
Broad Money as percent 
of GDP 
Captures assets that individuals and firms can make payments with 
and serve as a short-term investments. 
Positive (Nadler, 1964) World 
Bank 
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3.2.2 Dependent variables 
Monetary Policy Rate 
The policy rate is the rate set by the central bank or federal reserve. This is the rate which the 
central bank borrows to the commercial banks. The expectation is the that if the policy rate is high, 
commercial banks will increase lending rate to individuals, households and firms. With high 
interest rates, the private sector is very much likely to be crowded out leading low levels of growth. 
The conditional policies of the IMF are likely to affect the policy rate. The expectation is that, 
there is positive relationship such that when a country signs unto an IMF programme, the central 
bank will respond by increasing the policy rate. Data on this variable was retrieved from the IMF. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
FDI’s are investment decisions executed by multinational and transnational corporations who set 
up business entities in other jurisdictions other than their domicile countries. Investors take into 
account economic indicators of countries they are likely to invest before any venture. A country 
that signs unto an IMF programme paints a picture of uncertainty for investors. The expectation is 
that FDI is negatively related to IMF bailouts. Data on this variable was retrieved from the World 
Bank.  
Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
This captures the financial packages offered to the private sector by financial institutions by way 
of credit, purchases of securities, letters of credit and letters of guarantee and other instruments 
that ensures and provides a claim for repayment. When the cost of credit is low, it enables the 
private to access enough credit to finance their operations. Since IMF bailouts restricts credit, the 
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expectation is that there is negative relationship between the two variables. Data on domestic credit 
to the private sector was retrieved from the World Bank. 
3.3 Data validation and Ethical Issues 
 Data cleaning and regularization was done by Checking for numerical errors. Duplication of 
information were checked and addressed. Typographical errors which arose during transcription 
and inputting were also addressed. Grammatical and punctuation errors which were detected were 
also addressed appropriately. 
One of the critical issues in research on ethics is data misrepresentation. Data sets that represented 
particular variables were used as such and not renamed to fit another criterion for the study. 
Previous studies that were consulted and reviewed were properly and duly acknowledged.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.0  Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an empirical analysis and interpretation of the Panel data regression results. 
The regression analysis was done with both Fixed effects and Random effects. This was to allow 
for a more comprehensive comparisons of the results obtained from the two. The Hausman test 
was also done to ascertain which of the two was suitable in each case. The format of this chapter 
is to first present the discussions followed by the regression tables. 
4.1 Impact of IMF bailout on Monetary Policy Rate 
From Table 1, it could be revealed that there exists a positive relationship between IMF bailout 
and monetary policy rate. In column (1), if a country receives an IMF support programme, it leads 
to a .89 SD increase in the monetary policy rate. In column (2) for fixed effects, it leads to an 
increase of .96 SD from the mean. In column (4) with the year dummies, monetary policy rate 
increases by .87 SD from the mean and its significant at 5 percent. 
On the other hand, the exchange rate was negatively related to the monetary policy rate. In 
column’s (1) and (3), the coefficient under random effects was significant at 1 percent and led to 
a decline in monetary policy rate by .39 SD. However, in columns (2) and (5), IMF bailout for a 
country could lead to a .40 SD decrease in the monetary policy rate. This was significant at 5 
percent and under the fixed effect model. 
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Table 1 
Regression of Monetary Policy Rate 
  
Random 
Effects 
(1) 
Fixed 
Effects 
(2) 
Random 
Effects         
(3) 
Fixed                     
Effects                   
(4) 
IMF bailout 0.896** 0.962** 0.708 0.871** 
 (0.426) (0.417) (0.498) (0.413) 
Financial Risk 0.115* 0.116 0.119** 0.137 
 (0.065) (0.141) (0.056) (0.141) 
Economic Risk 0.116 0.309 -0.139 0.304 
 (0.180) (0.291) (0.191) (0.302) 
Exchange Rate Risk -0.391*** -0.399** -0.392*** -0.406** 
 (0.127) (0.183) (0.130) (0.197) 
Debt Service Risk -0.471** -0.500 -0.518*** -0.615 
 (0.223) (0.399) (0.211) (0.412) 
Budget balance Risk 0.111 -0.082 0.404* -0.058 
 (0.190) (0.303) (0.219) (0.301) 
Deposit Interest Rate 0.107 0.087 0.151* 0.111 
 (0.084) (0.143) (0.084) (0.155) 
Inflation Risk -0.405*** -0.579* -0.356*** -0.569 
 (0.088) (0.303) (0.059) (0.346) 
Broad Money % GDP -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 -0.030 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) (0.025) 
Investment Profile -0.286* -0.253 -0.214 -0.231 
 (0.170) (0.224) (0.227) (0.257) 
GDP Growth Risk -0.300 -0.488 -0.069 -0.514 
 (0.274) (0.366) (0.260) (0.359) 
Current Account Deficit Risk -0.422* -0.654* -0.065 -0.664* 
 (0.246) (0.388) (0.246) (0.372) 
Year dummies No No Yes Yes 
_cons 19.139 19.485 19.359 20.098 
  (3.647) (4.295) (3.433) (4.466) 
N 321 321 321 321 
R-sq  0.111  0.131 
Standard errors in parentheses    
                                  * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 
                                        
***   p<0.001   
Table 1: Results of Panel Data Regression (Effect on Monetary Policy Rate)                                                                                           
Source: Authors own computation using a secondary data September, 2019 
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Accordingly, the IMF bailout variable continued to show robustness and resilience when 
an interaction term was introduced. As depicted in Table 2, column (1) and (2) under 
random effects and fixed effects respectively had coefficients significant at 10 percent. An 
IMF bailout programme leads to an increase in .44 SD   in monetary policy rate under 
fixed effects having controlled for year dummies in column (4) 
  
Table 2 
Regression with interaction term 
Dependent Variable : Monetary Policy Rate 
  
Random 
Effect 
(1) 
Fixed            
Effect                
(2) 
Random 
Effect       
(3) 
Fixed    
Effect       
(4) 
IMF bailout 4.352* 3.822* 6.355**  4.445** 
 (2.600) (2.087) (2.873) (2.142) 
IMF bailout x Economic Risk 0.103 0.085 0.168** 0.106 
 (0.072) (0.058) (0.080) (0.059) 
Economic Risk 0.085 0.267 -0.231 0.255 
 (0.178) (0.287) (0.191) (0.304) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes 
_cons 20.830 20.883 22.091 21.921 
  (3.742) (4.567) (3.578) (4.606) 
N 321 321 321 321 
R-s  0.116  0.138 
Standard errors in 
parentheses     
                                    * p<0.10  ** p<0.05 
 *** 
p<0.001   
Table 2: Results of Panel Data Regression (Interaction Term)                                                                                      
Source: Authors own computation using a secondary data September, 2019 
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4.2 Effect of IMF bailout on Foreign Direct Investment 
 
The lender of last resort which is the IMF has at the core of its mandate to help finance the balance 
of payment deficit of member countries. This goes to suggest that before any nation goes for 
support from the IMF, that nation’s economy might not be in the best of shape. The IMF comes in 
to help in the restructuring of the economy by introducing reforms basically to control expenditure 
and the supply of money. 
Every investor makes decisions based on the guarantee of future returns to invested funds. 
Multinational and Transnational corporations are very much interested in the economic 
fundamentals of any nation the intent of investment has to be made. No investor would invest in a 
country where there are weak economic indices and as such the economic environment might not 
produce the needed returns to investment. 
According to Jensen (2004), after examining 68 countries and their enrollment on IMF 
programmes whiles controlling for country specific factors that led the countries to run to the IMF. 
It was found that signing on to an IMF programme led to a 25 percent decline in FDI inflows as 
compared to countries that did not sign on to IMF programmes. Again, another study of IMF 
support programmes in the caribbean and Latin America found a negative realtionship between 
FDI inflows and participating in an IMF programme (Mahate, 2018). 
In looking at the regression results below, IMF bailout and FDI inflows is negatively correlated 
corroborating the work of the two authors above. IMF bailout with random effects led to a decline 
of .55 SD in FDI and was signifcant at 10 percent. With fixed effects and year dummies in column 
(4), the coefficient was still negative showing a decline of .62 SD in FDI at the 10 percent 
significant level 
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Table 3 
Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment 
  
Random 
Effects     
(1) 
Fixed   
Effects       
(2) 
Random 
Effects 
(3) 
Fixed 
Effects   
(4) 
IMF bailout -1.546* -1.464* -1.730** -1.622* 
 (0.820) (0.790) (0.858) (0.817) 
Financial Risk 0.232* 0.470 0.228* 0.444 
 (0.127) (0.331) (0.139) (0.357) 
Economic Risk -0.331* -0.211 -0.289 -0.230 
 (0.188) (0.229) (0.212) (0.322) 
Exchange Rate Risk -0.032 -0.232 -0.212 -0.342 
 (0.160) (0.304) (0.196) (0.419) 
Debt Service Risk 0.920*** 0.896* 0.937*** 1.025* 
 (0.342) (0.478) (0.360) (0.543) 
Budget Deficit Risk 1.267*** 0.833 1.209*** 0.814 
 (0.439) (0.652) (0.397) (0.618) 
Deposit Interest Rate -0.024 0.150 -0.143 0.077 
 (0.125) (0.128) (0.150) (0.130) 
Inflation Risk -0.221*** -0.587 -0.251*** -0.420 
 (0.078) (0.442) (0.088) (0.402) 
Broad Money % GDP 0.020 0.074 0.026 0.101 
 (0.021) (0.064) (0.018) (0.070) 
Investment Profile -0.351 0.287 -0.554 0.085 
 (0.272) (0.396) (0.420) (0.492) 
GDP growth Risk 1.031*** 1.056** 1.026*** 1.074** 
 (0.335) (0.480) (0.339) (0.428) 
Current Account Deficit Risk -1.284** -1.151* -1.512** -1.265 
 (0.570) (0.613) (0.682) (0.785) 
Year Dummies No No Yes Yes 
_cons 0.170 -13.126 5.079 -11.478 
  (4.568) (10.952) (5.121) (10.167) 
N 417 417 417 417 
R-sq 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.26 
Standard errors in parentheses     
                                              *p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001   
Table 3: Results of Panel Data Regression (Dependent Variable:Foreign Direct Investment)                                                                                            
Source: Authors own computation using a secondary data September, 2019 
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4.3 Effect on Domestic Credit to the Private Sector 
 
The private sector is trumpeted as the engine of growth. Government indeed is the biggest 
institution in every nation but it cannot employ everybody and produce everything. The private 
sector plays a key role in keeping the economy running. In signing onto an IMF programme, 
through the injection of monetary and fiscal discipline, monetary policy becomes contractionary 
and hence interest rates increase. When interest rates increase. It crowds out private investment 
due to the fact that private firms are unable to borrow at the high interest rates. This in the long 
run stifles growth in the private sector and prevents local private firms from competing with bigger 
and more resourced firms (multinationals). 
From the analysis, it was revealed that IMF bailout had a negative effect on domestic credit to the 
private sector. This suggests that when a country signs unto an IMF programme, credit availability 
to the private sector reduces owing to contractionary monetary policies.  In the first column, the 
coefficient is significant at 5 percent representing a decline in .15 SD. In the fourth column with 
fixed effect, when a country receives a bailout programme from the IMF, it leads to a .33 SD 
decline in the level of domestic credit to the private sector. 
The results further revealed that broad money supply is positively correlated with domestic credit. 
This implies that when broad money supply increases by 1 percentage points, it leads to 36 
percentage point increase in the supply of domestic credit to the private sector. The coefficient 
remained robust from column (1) through column (4). In column (1) and (3) under random effects, 
it was significant at 1 percent whiles in column (2) and (4) under fixed effects, it was significant 
at 5 percent. This suggests that when assets can easily be converted into payment instruments, 
borrowers will be willing to lend using such assets as collateral 
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Table 4 
Effect on Domestic Credit to Private Sector 
  
Random 
Effect             
(1) 
Fixed      
Effect         
(2) 
Random 
Effect        
(3) 
Fixed 
Effect      
(4) 
IMF bailout -1.153** -1.138 -1.339** -1.331* 
 (0.586) (0.920) (0.543) (0.784) 
Deposit Interest Rate -0.194** -0.197 -0.042 -0.043 
 (0.094) (0.205) (0.090) (0.187) 
Interest Rate spread -0.067*** -0.066 -0.053** -0.052 
 (0.025) (0.048) (0.022) (0.037) 
Broad Money % GDP 0.358*** 0.350** 0.296*** 0.288** 
 (0.069) (0.127) (0.064) (0.124) 
Exchange Rate Risk 0.148 0.154 0.177 0.184 
 (0.157) (0.174) (0.141) (0.191) 
Investment Profile -0.064 -0.153 0.678* 0.605 
 (0.431) (0.636) (0.392) (0.494) 
_cons 10.854 12.360 3.276 4.510 
  (6.121) (8.727) (5.416) (6.299) 
N 337 337 337 337 
R-sq 0.42 0.43 52 0.52 
Standard errors in parentheses    
                              * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001  
Table 4: Results of Panel Data Regression (Effect on Domestic Credit to Private Sector)                                                                                           
Source: Authors own computation using a secondary data September, 2019 
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CHAPTER FIVE                                                                                                           
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.0  Introduction 
This chapter presents a summary to the findings of this study, relevant recommendations and 
conclusions based on theoretical and empirical literature reviewed. It also presents the limitations 
of the study and suggestions for future research. 
 
5.1  Summary of Major Findings 
The study employed a panel data model to explore the impact of IMF bailout on monetary policy 
rate. Monetary policy rate is the rate at which the central bank borrows to the commercial banks 
who in turn borrow to firms and households. 
It came out of the study that, countries that signed onto IMF programmes were more likely to have 
higher monetary policy rates. This is due to the fact that the IMF imposes restrictions on these 
countries by injecting monetary and fiscal disciplines. These conditionalities actually reduces the 
supply of money and hence leads to higher interest rates.   
The study also revealed that, an IMF supported programme leads to a decline in the net inflows of 
Foreign Direct Investments which supports results by several authors. The returns on investment 
is a critical question all investors answer before they make funds available for any venture.  Any 
country that runs to the IMF gives a signal that indeed all is not well with the economy which 
might be a negative incentive for multinational and transnational corporations.  
It came out of the study that, IMF bailouts reduced the level of domestic credit to the private sector. 
The private sector which has been noted to be the wheels on which growth could be championed 
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is the life line to any economy especially those in the Small and Medium Scale Enterprise. If IMF 
programmes reduces domestic credit to the private sector, it presupposes that, growth and 
expansion of SME’s would be stifled.  
 
5.2 Conclusion 
The study was grounded in the, the pecking order theory, loanable funds theory and the loan pricing 
theory. Indeed, the monetary policy rate set by the central bank goes to affect the cost of credit by 
commercial banks. Private firms will indeed issue debt to finance their operations. The study 
showed the relationship that an IMF programme had on Domestic credit to the private sector 
signaling a negative incentive for both financial institutions and the private firms. 
The IMF over the last decades has been heavily criticized about their injurious policies in the third 
world. The conditions posed on countries include cutting down on fiscal expenditure and 
suspending subsidies. These strings of conditions in the long run some have argued tend to affect 
the overall output of the economy. 
From the analysis, FDI which is an important component in every economy due to technological 
spillovers, employment creation, differentiation of products and its ability to raise the standard of 
living cannot be overlooked. the study concludes that, an IMF programme is a negative incentive 
for investors. The opportunity to reduce poverty and inequality though FDI’s are lost in seeing 
through the lens of an IMF support programme.  
 
 
32 
 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
From the findings above, some policy recommendations are made. 
 The independence of the central bank must be critical in every IMF agreement. This is to 
ensure that the monetary policy rate is not affected by IMF conditionalities. This will help 
to effectively manage an efficient market determination of the cost of credit by the 
commercial banks. 
 Governments who sign onto IMF programmes must negotiate keenly in the interest of their 
nations especially countries in the third world. Structural policies which hurt the economy 
in the long should be rejected. This calls for a roundtable dialogue of all Sub-Saharan 
African countries to have a common voice to reject aspects of IMF policies which hurt the 
monetary framework of countries.  
 Since there is empirical evidence to show that potential investors shy away from IMF 
programme run countries. The IMF must as a matter of urgency incorporate the 
mechanisms of FDI in such agreements. This would reassure potential investors of their 
return on investments and boost incentives for more inflows. This should not be done in 
isolation but must be part of the comprehensive programme support so that the interest of 
the state, investor and IMF is well defined. It is recommended that, subsidies and tax reliefs 
that are suspended under IMF programmes be reviewed. These are incentives that attract 
FDI’s hence their absence serves as a disincentive. 
 Government must begin to look at the issues of credit availability and credit access as it 
pertains to the private sector. The setting up of specialized institutions to offer competitive 
credit to the private sector will be a step in the right direction. This will broaden the net of 
private firms which can access credit at an affordable rate and not be affected by the 
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mechanisms of an IMF programme. These specialized institutions must be given the 
needed resource to train, monitor and profile up and coming private firms both in the formal 
and informal sector. This will enable the institutions to track and manage the funds 
efficiently to prevent misuse. This would prevent the crowding - out effect due to the high 
interest rates under IMF conditonalities. 
 Countries must empirically assess the long run effects of an IMF support on their 
economies before they sign on to such agreements. The need for financial literacy and civil 
society in this regard as well as academia is critical in this exercise. When outcomes are 
negative, it would deter governments from such agreements. 
5.3  Limitations of the Study and Future Research 
 
The study is without some limitations. The data constituted 35 countries in Sub- Saharan Africa. 
This could have been increased to 60 countries from around the world to incorporate other 
continents to make the data more robust and enrich the discussions. The model had 13 explanatory 
variables. This again could have been increased to capture country specific variables which 
influenced countries decision to go to the IMF. 
Moreover, effects of an IMF programme on other aspects of an  economy were not assessed in the 
analysis which though very significant would have helped to espouse on the results more precisely. 
One of the limitations in using a panel data is controlling for time variant unobserved factors. 
Future studies could use an instrumental variable to address such a limitation. Due to time 
constraints more empirical studies could have been reviewed to compare and contrast the various 
methodologies so as to broaden the discussion on the appropriate methodology. Future studies 
could review such intensely. 
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